30 August is a good day for Australians to remember that the so-called 'realists' in Canberra got it wrong for 24 years. I'm pretty sure a whole lot of them still think 'well, our strategic priorities just changed pre and post 1999, the cold war was over, and who saw that the New Order regime would collapse?'. I'm pretty sure they also think 'teh Left' were just a bunch of unrealistic and idealist whingers who accidentally got something right for once.
Au contraire. Along with saying the occupation was wrong, and a human rights disaster, the East Timor solidarity movements were also pointing to a critical empirical factor: Indonesia was not likely to succeed. How could a forced integration - with no basis in international law, unrecognised by any other state, with no respect for human rights, and implacably opposed by a nation of people - succeed in the long run? Its like the inevitability of a Palestinian state. Power cannot operate without legitimacy forever. Foreign policy 'realism' does not equate to pragmatism, how ever much the back-slapping defence and security circle-jerkers might fancy it does.
The major parties in this country were frankly out of touch with reality. They appeared to believe that just because it suited our imagined strategic priorities, a military occupation that could not even establish a monopoly of force after 24 years was some stable 'fact on the ground', that we all just had to live with. Let history record that the Australian people saw through it all first, and the 'experts' in Canberra followed.
I hope the lesson is not lost. Justice matters in international affairs. Foreign policy 'realism' does not make you realistic.
30 comments:
"Power cannot operate without legitimacy forever."
Forever's a long time to wait, Leftisto. I wonder whether the Tibetans think the Chinese are "realists".
Also, I think you're overdoing the illegitimacy/inevitability etc. East Timor only had a chance at independence because of the Asian Crisis and the consequent fall of Suharto's regime. Up until that point there was Buckley's that the Javanese would voluntarily give up that slice of their hegemony, and nobody was proposing to take it off them.
I notice the West Papuans don't get much play here - maybe they should learn Portuguese?
'-maybe they should learn Portuguese?'.
Truer than you might think- though its a bit late in the piece .
West Papua had the additional problem of Indonesia being the successor state to the Dutch Indies - which gave Jakarta at least some basis in international law. There was none at all in the case of the former Portuguese Timor.
I think the Asian crisis overplayed - in the sense that some species of disorder was inevitable sooner or later in the Javanese empire. And the question was only which restive province was first in line. DFAT could have worked this out. It aint China and Tibet!
When it came, ET was already ungovernable and a headache. Sure it took regime change in Jakarta, but by that point they had two Nobel Laureates, a global solidarity movement, and 11,000 dead TNI. The Timorese, of course, were proposing to take it off them.
If West Papua had been colonised by any other than the Dutch, it'd be next in line.
And even the Han Empire - pretty touchy on the subject arent they? Not feeling overly secure. The Chinese worry all day about legitimacy - qua prosperity these days, but nonetheless. I reckon Tibet'd roll free about 10 minutes after Chinese Communism collapsed. Of course, the pressure for democratic reform might be contained - or it may not (as Suharto found out).
"I think the Asian crisis overplayed - in the sense that some species of disorder was inevitable sooner or later in the Javanese empire."
Mmyeah, but such is the nature of empires - they're vulnerable to "disorders". The problem presented to our foreign policy wonks was what to do in the meantime while waiting for a crack to appear?
I don't think the the Asian Crisis is over-played - it was an unusually severe economic crisis that affected Indonesia particularly badly - we (i.e. the Australian nation-state) could not have counted on such an event occurring within a reasonable time frame. Contra your assertion, Indonesia under Suharto et al was eminently willing and able to continue occupying the country indefinitely - 11,000 is a drop in the bucket when you Java's demographics on your side.
You suggest an idealist course of action, but that would have resulted in a lot of headache for no benefit. Personally, I don't see much that was wrong with successive Australian governments' behaviour on the issue. IMO the worst, ironically, was Whitlam, for foregoing even token protest at the TNI's bad manners in executing Australian citizens in the course of an invasion he condoned.
West Papua was Dutch. So what? There are twice as many people there oppressed by the Javanese and yet TL gets all the hankies blowing.
Point re crisis is Fy, Golkar and CCP have much in common: prosperity is their only legitimacy card. Downturns and economic crises are inevitable, but you wont see the US constitutional liberal regime blowing over in that storm. Its got other sources of legitimacy.
TBC... gotta go mess w young heads.
How could a forced integration - with no basis in international law, unrecognised by any other state, with no respect for human rights, and implacably opposed by a nation of people - succeed in the long run?
Good questions, Izquierdista. By your rules, though, the Kurds have an even better entitlement to national self-determination than the East Timorese. Do you propose an idealist course of action in Middle Eastern/Persian foreign policy, I mean, remembering how well it's worked there in the past?
"Good questions, Izquierdista. By your rules, though, the Kurds have an even better entitlement to national self-determination than the East Timorese. Do you propose an idealist course of action in Middle Eastern/Persian foreign policy, I mean, remembering how well it's worked there in the past?"
Excellent point.
Irrelevant trivia: the Kurds have a very long history as a distinct ethnic group - the Athenian mercenary Xenophon recounts fighting them in the retreat of the Ten Thousand from Persia in his Anabasis.
WV = "podiumme"
*blushes*
Gosh, thanks very much!
Ah, well, I'm actually opposing the stale distinction of realism/ idealism here. I accuse realism of being non-pragmatic in the case of Timor - and not predicting the ultimate failure of integration.
I agree that Kurdistan has an equal claim to self-determination - though I dont see why it would be greater, Liam. In any case, Iraqi Kurdistan IS independent in all but name.
Im arguing, above all, the merely claiming the mantle of a "realist" doesn't make you a good analyst. I do accuse Canberra of missing all the signs - which were evident as early as the mid 80s (mobilisation of international network of nations in support of a referendum in ET, failure of Indonesia to incorporate the Timorese Church into the Indonesian structure, the rise of Tetum not Bahasa in Churches, the failure to quash the military resistance, the pro-democracy movement within Indonesia etc).
They could have done any number of things from 75: eg support a referendum on self-determination, which was one of their rhetorical positions anyway, and would hardly have shocked Suharto; they could NOT have recognised the occupation as legitimate. They clearly would have got away with that - since every other nation on the globe didnt. Jakarta couldnt believe their lucky day when we went de jure.
No one's suggesting we should have invaded on their behalf - but we got shopped. Indo Foreign Affairs totally outsmarted DFAT in 75: leaked all the invasion info deliberately so we were compromised in our response - especially when 6 of our journos were murdered. There was, above all, no dignity in Canberra's response.
Anyhoo - I certainly dont downplay West Papua. I am merely pointing out there is SOME skerrick of international law on jakarta's side there (succession). That isn't enough under international law - and even Jakarta acknowledged that by running a faux-referundum in '61. In Timor, jakarta had nuthin.
naturally, there's also a wee element of provocation in the post. And why? fact is- the solidarity movements predicted the failure of integration, and the experts in canberra didnt. I guess Im not above pointing that out! :)
"Fact is- the solidarity movements predicted the failure of integration, and the experts in canberra didnt."
The solidarity movements had no alternative - of course they had to be optimistic. Also, what makes you so sure that Canberra didn't predict failure?
Even if DFA et al had agreed with your assertion that Indonesian failure was inevitable, would it have proposed that Australia piss off Indonesia for 20+ years? That's what it comes down to: the realist approach to diplomacy is to accept what you can't or shouldn't change and focus on what you can and should.
Well, eg Singapore never recognised the occupation. They had perfectly amicable relations w Jakarta throughout. PNG didn't either - hardly a regional giant! There was just no need for that position at all - even from a so-called realist perspective.
And its well-known that DFAT and the military had no contingency in place for an -INTERFET style outcome. Whatever they knew, or didnt, the key point is DFAT didnt *want* an independent ET on its doorstep. This "realist' perspective was normative (not empirical-analytical) and became a blindfold which prevented them seeing - until well after everyone else - that their policy was in tatters.
"Well, eg Singapore never recognised the occupation. They had perfectly amicable relations w Jakarta throughout. PNG didn't either - hardly a regional giant! There was just no need for that position at all - even from a so-called realist perspective."
Depends on what you want, though, doesn't it? Singapore, that non-Muslim, non-Bumi ["Chinese!" *spits*] entrepot was never going to get along with Indonesia anyway. Remember that *cough* war we fought against the Indonesians in Borneo? The one that led a bit later on to the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the guarantee of Singaporean and Malaysian integrity?
PNG? You mean the neighbour to Irian Jaya, sorry, West Papua?
"And its well-known that DFAT and the military had no contingency in place for an -INTERFET style outcome. Whatever they knew, or didnt, the key point is DFAT didnt *want* an independent ET on its doorstep. This "realist' perspective was normative (not empirical-analytical) and became a blindfold which prevented them seeing - until well after everyone else - that their policy was in tatters."
OK, coupla points:
1. DFA didn't have a contingency plan for INTERFETtery because nobody expected the Spanish Inquisition. Or a 180 degree turnaround in Indonesian policy, particularly in a short space of time. This is not the same thing as not identifying the underlying fragility of Indonesia's hold on the country.
2. Too right they didn't want an independent ET on their doorstep. Should they have? It's been an expensive nuisance for us ever since.
3. "Realist" is not the opposite of "Normative".
4. The policy wasn't in tatters - it was "overtaken by events". In hindsight, the problem was not anticipating the rapid collapse of Suharto's regime, early enough, and its consequences for ET. That was a hard ask, you'd have to admit.
WV = "mates"
Bloody hell that's good.
I dont see why it would be greater, Liam. In any case, Iraqi Kurdistan IS independent in all but name.
Well there it is---I see their entitlement to statehood emanating from the barrels of the guns they use to legitimise it, which they threaten to do in Iran, are on the verge of doing in Turkey, and as you say, do already by de facto at the moment in Iraq.
/hyper-realist
I accuse realism of being non-pragmatic in the case of Timor
Surely the greater crime is that the DFAT realists were non-pragmatic in the case of Suharto Indonesia's questionable value as a bulwark against late 1970s Communism? Lots of national liberation movements get betrayed---the Palestinians and the Kurds being only the most obvious---but there's always a point.
What *was* the pro-Indonesian argument? Fucked if I know, but the simple lack of a pro-Suharto argument doesn't translate easily into pro-Timor Leste stance.
I mean, the problem isn't that they sucked up to the corrupt old butcher, because let's face it, DFAT was and is an old player in the business of old-corrupt-butcher-sucking-up, it's that there was never explicitly articulated any particular reason for supporting Suharto over FALINTIL/FRETILIN. Apart from, well, habit.
WV: "subjowsh". Hm, edgy.
Appreciate the quality enstoushment,chaps.
A few points:
Fyodor: look, yes, it wasn't a long time, but longer than you suggest. The Habibie letter (allegedly the sign of a shift in policy) - was sent in december 98. DFAT itself had no change of policy - and spent the next 10 months trying to poo-poo the idea that we would go in. As a result it had nothing in place 10 days before INTERFET except evac plans for westerners.
Some realists! I mean, if it wasnt bleeding obvious from June 98 (when Habibie signalled gerater autonomy proposals) then you musta had your head in the ground. Or wedged up an out of date policy doe far youd gone blind. And that was our "experts"!
Here's the (realist) thing: once its totally inevitable, wouldnt you want a stake in it? If it hadn't been for the Australian people collaring our govt and literally pushing them in, would we have any influence there now at all? Or just left it over to the Chinese, or Portuguese? Again, some realists.
Liam - quite so, and I reckon the closest they got to that was Whitlam having some weird idea that supporting Indonesia was the "anti-colonial" thing to do. After all, the Fretilin crew were all "mesticos" a/c to the big W; and Woolcott reckoning we could divvy up the Timor sea gas easier with jakarta.
Speaking of which, some DFAT noobs never give up. Here's 'finger on realist pulse' Woolcott still in complete denial 4 years later. http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/03/07/1046826536143.html?from=moreStories
WV: cesseth. Sheesh,I was just getting rolling...
If it hadn't been for the Australian people collaring our govt and literally pushing them in
And that was one of the most bizarre bits about it.
You'd go to a rally in the winter and spring of 1999, and there'd be Trots selling papers, middle-aged Greens, cardigan-wearing Eastern suburbs nice (pron. "naiiiischhe") folk, feminists, anti-racists, Quakers and the next generation of bourgeois law students, all bellowing, by jingo, for the ADF to stage an amphibious combined arms landing in a gas-rich ex-colony in the face of the TNI.
"Indonesia Out! Australia In!" I can hear the chant now.
heh. I know. Some Trots had a really hard time with the unfamiliar concepts at play. They were much happier 2 years later when Australia was trying to nick the oil and gas revenues. Back to Cowboys and Injuns as we knew it.
A number of times Ive had to explain to a poor lost trot that if they ever found a Timorese who also regarded INTERFET as 'Ostrayan imperialism' - they should probably contact the UN serious crimes unit. And then get the hell out of Atambua.
"I mean, the problem isn't that they sucked up to the corrupt old butcher, because let's face it, DFAT was and is an old player in the business of old-corrupt-butcher-sucking-up"
YSTLIABT
Back to Lefty Timor:
"DFAT itself had no change of policy - and spent the next 10 months trying to poo-poo the idea that we would go in. As a result it had nothing in place 10 days before INTERFET except evac plans for westerners."
Why is this surprising? DFAT doesn't do much logistics beyond bail and passport replacement and the working assumption in Australian defence/foreign policy since 1788 is you don't do ANYTHING risky until Big Bro de Jour assures you he's got your back. The other reason is that we were and are woefully equipped for any kind of force projection into a (potentially) hostile theatre - no amount of planning was going to overcome the basic fact that we were biting off more than we could chew.
"Here's the (realist) thing: once its totally inevitable, wouldnt you want a stake in it? If it hadn't been for the Australian people collaring our govt and literally pushing them in, would we have any influence there now at all? Or just left it over to the Chinese, or Portuguese? Again, some realists."
Whoah, Nelly, back up a minute here. Influence over 1m impoverished people with a bit of natural gas and an economy that puts the FU in FUBAR? In Realist terms, honestly, who gives a shit? The upside for us is that that the place becomes less of a liability to us and we...um...feel good about ourselves. The downside is that "East Timor will be your Haiti", but without the funky Caribbean voodoo vibe. Bugger that for a game of soldiers.
"Speaking of which, some DFAT noobs never give up. Here's 'finger on realist pulse' Woolcott still in complete denial 4 years later."
Woolcott'd be a nob, wouldn't he? If anything he proved to be not noobie enough. Nevertheless, I think his analysis is pretty solid. What part of it do you find so objectionable?
The process of carving ET out of Indonesia was always going to be messy but I think everyone could have done a better job than the clusterfuck that resulted. It's also worth noting that it's still early days for this tiny nation and the track record to-date isn't great. The really unfortunate part is that the oil & gas wealth may prove to be more of a curse than a blessing given the fragility of the political system. The conjunction of disproportionate resource wealth and unstable political systems often produces kleptocracies.
P.S. Apologies for the following pedantry, but the department wasn't called DFAT back in the 1970s. The innovation of tacking Trade (hitherto a junior satrapy for Country/National Party protectionists) on to Foreign Affairs came about later, with Gareth "Biggles" Evans.
WV = "modik" = white whale?
if they ever found a Timorese who also regarded INTERFET as 'Ostrayan imperialism'
True story: when Sydney FC were in the Asian Cup a year or two ago, and Persik Kediri* came over for the SFC home match, there were a bunch of Indo blokes behind the goals, kettled in by the NSW police, waving red-and-white flags, wearing green camouflage dacks, red berets and jackets with a yellow triangle patch I only recognised as (in)famous once I got home and looked it up on the internet. I don't know if it was costume or not, but they invaded Parramatta Stadium.
*In the away round played, the bench players were smoking while they waited to be subbed on. Respect
DFAT doesn't do much logistics beyond bail and passport replacement
Don't forget our valiant skilled overseas agents, Fyodor, out there protecting the national interest.
http://www.theage.com.au/ffximage/2006/10/13/knAWB_wideweb__470x329,0.jpg
well, its surprising cos allegedly, in the world according to Downer, the Habibie letter was an historic shift in policy settings, and we knew for 10 months that the referendum would happen when it did. Instead we had guys in Washington from early 99 seriously tasked to talk Clinton's administration out of any expectation that we might go in to peacekeep - so DFAT cant pretend they thought it would be biz-as-usual.
And in realist terms, security heads generally DO think we need a stake in small places that might otherwise come under Chinese influence. That's 101 to defence heads, and more than one commentator in the field believes thats why we're in the Sols too.
As for Woolcott: "Indonesia had completely failed to win the hearts and minds of the East Timorese people (despite considerable investment in infrastructure and education) in a way which had not been anticipated in 1975."
What, it wasnt already obvious when they proposed a military invasion to win hearts and minds? it sure was by '78 when they 100,000 were dead.
"The second major consequence is that our relationship with Indonesia has been substantially damaged and may take years to repair."
Nope. Actually, quite a few people other than Woolcott noticed there was a huge reform movement inside Indonesia that would change that landscape considerably.
Heh. Trevor Flugge - L'Agent Profanateur.
Surprisingly, not a DFAT or SIS agent, but the former Chairman of one our bastions of agrarian socialism, the wheat marketing monopoly AWB, and a (failed) National Party candidate. Paid seven hunjee out of the FUCKING AID BUDGET so that we could protect "our" wheat market in Iraq. Take a bow Johnny Howard.
"Well, its surprising cos allegedly, in the world according to Downer, the Habibie letter was an historic shift in policy settings, and we knew for 10 months that the referendum would happen when it did. Instead we had guys in Washington from early 99 seriously tasked to talk Clinton's administration out of any expectation that we might go in to peacekeep - so DFAT cant pretend they thought it would be biz-as-usual."
I don't follow your argument. Woolcott makes it clear that DFAT preferred a "less prominent" and "less demanding", i.e. more weaselly, form of contribution from Australia. That's consistent with your description. From the Realist perspective, taking the leadership role in peacekeeping always risked the greater good (i.e. good relations with Indonesia) for the lesser (i.e. helping out a tiny fragile state).
"And in realist terms, security heads generally DO think we need a stake in small places that might otherwise come under Chinese influence. That's 101 to defence heads, and more than one commentator in the field believes thats why we're in the Sols too."
And PNG and Vanuatu, except that - oh yeah! - we don't have our army in those countries and don't risk pissing off our most important neighbour by interfering with them.
Of course we have to take AN interest in ET, but the question is one of proportionality, and Woolcott is clearly arguing that we went in too hard and damaged our diplomacy with Indonesia as a result.
"What, it wasnt already obvious when they proposed a military invasion to win hearts and minds? it sure was by '78 when they 100,000 were dead."
No, in 1975 it wasn't obvious that the TNI was going to kill 100,000 people by 1978.
"Nope. Actually, quite a few people other than Woolcott noticed there was a huge reform movement inside Indonesia that would change that landscape considerably."
I don't agree with you there. Yes, reformists have a more balanced view of Australia, but IMO there's still a hard core of Javanese nationalists/imperialists who have a profoundly negative view of Australia as a result of what they see as our opportunistic meddling in their affairs when their country was on its knees. That goes for a large chunk of the sizeable military-strategic policy complex. The fact that those guys aren't running the show at the moment doesn't mean they're not there, or not important.
seven hunjee?!! I'd do a lame ass 'make my day' routine for half that.
Well, we could traverse history all day Fyodor (and ...probably have!) but I think the record alone establishes my initial point I wanted to make: certain so-called idealists analysed the situation better than wiseowls in Canberra. Admittedly, they weren't called the "indo lobby" because they were detached analysts. Suffice to say, realism is as normative /value-oriented as our maligned idealists.
I for one disagree with Woolcott's appeasement at all costs. He underestimates how little we have done our 'friends in Indonesia' favours by running interference for the same TNI they've been trying to reform out of politics for 11 years. And frankly, it didn't win us any respect there. In fact... what did we get out of it? Id like Woolcott to explain that.
"Well, we could traverse history all day Fyodor (and ...probably have!) but I think the record alone establishes my initial point I wanted to make: certain so-called idealists analysed the situation better than wiseowls in Canberra. Admittedly, they weren't called the "indo lobby" because they were detached analysts. Suffice to say, realism is as normative /value-oriented as our maligned idealists."
I don't think your point has been established, LE. I haven't seen any evidence that these "detached analysts" you mention had any particular insight into the Indonesian occupation or that they predicted the events that caused the Indonesians to withdraw. Simply being opposed to Indonesian occupation doesn't qualify one as having superior insight.
Furthermore, you're repeating a category mistake in conflating Realism with Positivism in your strawman construction of Realism.
Apologies for teaching you to suck eggs etc., but the relevant contrasts are:
Realism : Idealism
Positive : Normative
Both Realism and Idealism are normative in that they are both concerned with values, perspective and action. The key difference is that they prioritise values differently. This is very different from positive statements, which are concerned with "reality", i.e. the way things are, how they work.
One can be a "realist" and still be a terrible analyst of a particular geopolitical situation and, likewise, be idealist and get the analysis right. There's no necessary connection between one's normative motivations and analysing a situation correctly, i.e. accurately.
"I for one disagree with Woolcott's appeasement at all costs. He underestimates how little we have done our 'friends in Indonesia' favours by running interference for the same TNI they've been trying to reform out of politics for 11 years. And frankly, it didn't win us any respect there. In fact... what did we get out of it? Id like Woolcott to explain that."
I think you're being unfair in your characterisation here. We've never had "appeasement at all costs" as our policy towards Indonesia, and I don't think you're really aware of how DFAT actually saw the situation in the 1970s, or the degree to which the PM of the day drove "Canberra's" policy.
I also think you under-estimate the diplomatic challenge of dealing productively with a military disctatorship. It's an unfortunate reality of diplomacy that, though you may not like shit sandwiches, you do have to eat them occasionally.
The benefits of our diplomatic relations with Indonesia are that we were able to turn a position of antagonistic confrontation (Konfrontasi?) into one of constructive engagement, on a wide variety of issues.
You can assert that we got "nothing" out of this policy, but we don't know the counter-factual, i.e. how badly things could have turned out.
Id probably go empirical: normative myself Fy, but you're missing the point of my usage. Many IR 'realists' truly fancy their own label, and think their own values (prioritising national interest as primary method of analysis)award them some special powers of insight and engagement w reality. Which it doesnt. This is aprt of the reasons the 'idealist' school now calls itself the Liberal school. Realists tend to promote the conflation.
Trust me, the people actually paying some attention to the issue of Timor (unlike DFAT, who only saw it through the prism of Jakarta's interests) were - reading the run of play very differently to the Indo lobby in Canberra. Generally post cold-war, and particularly post the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991. See eg this, from 1992, and note the last line. http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/process/during/uruguay/regional/09071292.htm
This line of thinking turned out to be correct, and not just wish-fulfillment (which of course it also was, in another sense). I could track down a dozen similar analyses from 91-96 on how the issue was heading, though many are pre-net.
You may be unaware of how toey and cautious Suharto was pre-invasion (compared to his gun-ho Generals)/ There's considerable evidence he wouldnt have pulled the trigger without the behind the scenes reassurance he sought and got from Ford and Whitlam.
And most importantly - can I goad you over the magic BmL 24 comment record? :)
'tratest', oui, se moi.
One can be a "realist" and still be a terrible analyst of a particular geopolitical situation and, likewise, be idealist and get the analysis right
Quite, Fyodor. As Reagan, the Cold War booster was, without meaning to, about the Soviet Union, counter to just about every other analyst.
Izquierdista, it's not a special power of insight, it's the difference between the questions "what's the right, ethical thing to do in this situation", and "what's the best and worst that could happen in this situation"?
Obviously Whitlam, we all agree, answered both wrong---but let's remember that when the invasion happened in 1975 the question of whether a "military occupation of force" could endure despite popular opposition could only be answered, looking at the Warsaw Pact countries as examples, with the answer "of course".
WV: "muderre". Not in a just war, according to Augustine.
"it's not a special power of insight, it's the difference between the questions "what's the right, ethical thing to do in this situation", and "what's the best and worst that could happen in this situation"
As above, mes amis, I dont think anyone here is confused about that. The exception is perhaps the Indo lobby 'realists' themselves, who fancied the Timor solidarity movement was too hung on human rights and namby-pamby to analyse prevailing trends correctly.
They were wrong. And we were right. They were undeniably caught with their pants down in 1999. FFS, the CNRT was doing up transition to government manifestos in Mozambique in *1998* while Canberra did rain-dances and hoped it would go away. Yes, 1998.
Its nice to remind them 10 years on of precisely that point you note: being an idealist doesnt make you a crap analyst.
"Many IR 'realists' truly fancy their own label, and think their own values (prioritising national interest as primary method of analysis)award them some special powers of insight and engagement w reality. Which it doesnt. This is aprt of the reasons the 'idealist' school now calls itself the Liberal school. Realists tend to promote the conflation."
Yes, realists often believe that their take gives them better insight, just as you are arguing now for the idealist school. The "Liberal" nomenclature obviously follows the US interpretation of "Liberal", which is kinda ironic given the deeply idealistic motivations of the neocons.
"Trust me, the people actually paying some attention to the issue of Timor (unlike DFAT, who only saw it through the prism of Jakarta's interests) were - reading the run of play very differently to the Indo lobby in Canberra."
Wow, you've really got some animus there! "Prism of Jakarta's interests"? As I implied earlier, I think you'd be surprised at the level of nuance and sophistication that DFA/DFAT applied to the situation. As I said, I think you're mischaracterising that perspective.
That said, the interested parties you mention were reading the situation very differently, but I think what you're failing to acknowledge is that the occupation ended because of a totally external catalyst: the Asia Crisis and its effect on Indonesia. Independence for ET had very little to do with any catalyst on the ground in that country.
That is, those predicting the inevitability of Indonesian failure may have got it right, but not for the correct reason. This doesn't make them any better analysts than those pantywaists at DFAT. Hoges provides a characteristically insightful comment here, which is bang on, for my money:
"Obviously Whitlam, we all agree, answered both wrong---but let's remember that when the invasion happened in 1975 the question of whether a "military occupation of force" could endure despite popular opposition could only be answered, looking at the Warsaw Pact countries as examples, with the answer "of course"."
%*
"You may be unaware of how toey and cautious Suharto was pre-invasion (compared to his gun-ho Generals)/ There's considerable evidence he wouldnt have pulled the trigger without the behind the scenes reassurance he sought and got from Ford and Whitlam."
I am aware of that. Are you aware of the level of conflict between DFA and Whitlam on the issue, and the degree to which Whitlam dictated policy to DFA (and Don Willesee, the then-Minister for FA), not vice versa?
"And most importantly - can I goad you over the magic BmL 24 comment record? :)"
Oh yeah, baby.
* Yairs, I know: Three Paragraph Rule be damn'd!
WV = "sudes". Su-su-susilo!
Huzzah, for the glorious 25th!
Im happy enough - now that I no longer feel mischaracterised - to concede that your position is a defensible one Fy, even if we disagree. Small notes: I doubt the Asian crisis of itself would have tipped Jakarta if it wasnt for the previous 10 years of shifts at the UN level (partic. Portugal and the CPLP countries really driving the referendum right to prominence, and, outside Indo/ US/ AU - acceptance as a goal). Our realist firends dont care about the UN by def;n, and tend to underplay how the alck of legitmacy wore on jakarta over the years.
Indonesia was ALSO thoroughly disheartened by the RENETIL generation being so implacably opposed to integration. They'd written off the '75ers, but hoped the '95-ers who spoke Bahasa would go loyal. They didnt. In its heart of hearts, even Jakarta knew that was it for the 27th province project.
And yes, Im aware of the DFA/ Whitlam conflict. True enough, some of them should not be so tarred - but they were goine by the period I discuss. Interestingly, Oz Defence in the late 60s was quite anti-integration.*
As for "of course" Liamista - ja, but but dont forget the 300 Sparrow force vets who took the Japanese 10-1 on casualties in the mountains of East Timor. They never wrote off FALINTIL. Of course they could never win - but neither could Japan/ Indo establish the necessary monopoly of force.
*Yes. This thread operatesunder 'special period' regs, authorised by the BmL Exec in a closed session. These include indefinite suspension of the 3-para rule until order (viz 'silly one liners about forts n crap') is restored.
but but dont forget the 300 Sparrow force vets who took the Japanese 10-1 on casualties in the mountains of East Timor. They never wrote off FALINTIL.
Would I ever? I'm sure the wonks in the seventies didn't...
...certainly having internalised far better than their Cousins the futility of inferring strategic victory or defeat from bodycounts.
I can never read the words "Sparrow Force" and not think of commandos waking up, like, really, really early.
"I doubt the Asian crisis of itself would have tipped Jakarta if it wasnt for the previous 10 years of shifts at the UN level (partic. Portugal and the CPLP countries really driving the referendum right to prominence, and, outside Indo/ US/ AU - acceptance as a goal). Our realist firends dont care about the UN by def;n, and tend to underplay how the alck of legitmacy wore on jakarta over the years."
OK, now I think you're conflating "realists" with hard-core neocon US exceptionalists. Of course the UN matters; how MUCH is the question.
You won't be surprised to hear that I don't think Portugal, the UN etc. had much on an impact on Indonesia's release of ET, relative to the crippling impact of the Asian Crisis. Because Australia sailed through the crisis largely unscathed, reporting on it was predictably slight in Australia, but the effect on Indonesia and some other countries in SE Asia was profound, akin to the Great Depression in many ways.
Wikipedia is pretty good on this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_of_Suharto
When the IDR depreciated 80% it touched off massive inflation in the domestic price of fuel and food, triggering spontaneous rioting and massive civil unrest, which led ultimately to Suharto stepping down and eventual reforms, one of which was abandoning the occupation of ET.
The crisis of legitimacy that proved to be the catalysing force for ET independence did not originate from the Indonesian occupation of ET, but the incompetent rule of the Suharto regime.
P.S. "Su-Su-Susilo!"
Come. The. Fuck. On! Where is the love? Pearls before swine, I tells ya.
You're right: we forgot to pay Su-si-lo, which was worth price of entry!
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